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Project management continues to evolve as types of projects increase, advancement of 
technologies available, as well as tools for project management grow in sophistication.  A 
successful project is defined as being completed on schedule, on budget, and delivering the 
requirements as specified by the customer.  Projects with new technologies or with technologies 
requiring maturation add another dimension and challenge for the project manager.  Four factors 
 
are identified as integral to project success; leadership, requirements definition, technology usage 
and maturity, and vision and clear objectives.  Three historical projects involving new 
technologies are evaluated within the context of the four factors:  the Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird 
aircraft, the Hoover Dam project, and Project Apollo.  The projects are qualitatively ranked as 
successful based on the cost, schedule, and delivering requirements criteria.  The three projects 
were successful.  Each project ranked strongly in the four factors and remain consistent 
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The term Project Management is relatively new in our vocabulary, although this process has 
existed throughout history.  From the Egyptian pyramids to modern day construction projects 
and large-scale information technology projects, project management is widely used to guide 
these accomplishments. In 1956, the American Association of Cost Engineers was established, 
providing a professional society for project managers, cost estimators, and schedulers, and 
formalized the project management term.  (Haughey, 2010) This trend has continued and project 
management is part of the common vernacular now.  Project management has taken on a larger 
context and continues to grow in importance as new projects increase in size, cost, and 
complexity.  One facet of project management consistently adding difficulty is that of technology 
usage.  Whether to achieve the edge in a competitive market, efficiency in business processes, or 
the advantage over your adversaries in weaponry, the use of new technologies complicates 
project management.  Often, the success of the project may hinge on the usage of the technology 
to achieve its basic requirements.  Other factors such as the reliance on software, information 
systems, and data management has added additional layers of complexity and the consequent 
challenge to project management.  However, this research will focus on what key factors enabled 
projects heavily dependent on technology usage to be successful.  Project management has 
evolved as new tools (often made possible by technologies as well) and methods advance.   
However, despite these advances, the realization of a successful project often is elusive with 
resultant cost and schedule overruns or unattained customer requirements.   
An example for illustration is the current acquisition of the F-35 Lightning II aircraft by the 
United States’ Department of Defense (DoD).  The F-35, or commonly known as the Joint Strike 
Fighter, is produced by Lockheed-Martin Corporation and will replace several tactical aircraft 
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used by the U.S Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and by numerous allied nations of the 
United States. Conceived as a “joint” weapon system, it was to be an aircraft with high 
commonality between the airframe, engine, and avionics.  The aircraft would then have three 
variants each outfitted modular components to meet the specific needs of the three U.S. services.  
Originally budgeted to cost $233 billion for development and procurement, the current cost is 
$428 billion with a total lifecycle cost well over $1.5 trillion. (Kennedy S. , 2021) It is the single 
largest acquisition program ever undertaken by the Department of Defense.  The aircraft has 
suffered significant schedule delays, scheduled to be operational with the U.S. services in 2010.  
At this time, it is still awaiting a decision to start full rate production with limited quantities 
being delivered.  Although many factors have contributed to the F-35’s poor track record, the 
aircraft’s avionics, sensors, and weapon integration are very software intensive, exacerbating the 
technology maturity challenges and subsequent delays and cost overruns.  Conversely, the 
worldwide pandemic caused by the outbreak of the COVID-19 virus in late 2019 has generated a 
massive global response to develop a vaccine to prevent the spread of the virus.  In the United 
States, Operation Warp Speed (OWS), a cooperative program between the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) and the DoD was launched to help accelerate the development of 
a COVID-19 vaccine. (Operation Warp Speed, 2021, p. 2) The OWS has been compared to 
Project Apollo, the U.S. led effort to “put a man on the moon within the decade” in terms of 
technological achievement and global impact. In nine months five of the six OWS vaccine 
candidates have entered phase 3 clinical trials, two of which—Moderna’s and Pfizer/BioNTech’s 
vaccines—have received an emergency use authorization from the Food and Drug 
Administration. (Shulkin, 2021, p. 1) 
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Acknowledging the acquisition of the F-35 aircraft for the U.S. military and developing a 
vaccine to combat a pandemic are very different projects, are there factors that can differentiate 
the stunning success of the OWS versus the poor performance of the F-35?  Both are large scale 
projects, heavily dependent on innovative technologies, and require the collaboration of many 
stakeholders to be successful.  Are there key factors that enable the success of projects 
leveraging new technologies?  
Success has varied widely, and depends on one’s perspective.   Although the definition of project 
success will be elaborated upon within the body of this paper,  
• In short, a successful project is one completed on time, on budget, and satisfying the 
customer’s requirements.  
• The critical question that may be asked is what enables a successful project? Are there 
key elements or attributes that increase the probability of success or are inherently 
responsible for a favorable project outcome?  
This thesis discusses and analyzes four key factors and their relationship to project success. The 
description of the factors, how selected, and their importance are introduced and described in 
Section 1 of this work. Subsequently, specific projects chosen for the study are discussed, 
including background, size, cost, and whether private or public. The projects are evaluated based 
on the definition of success mentioned above, primarily cost, schedule, and performance 
(satisfying the requirements). Finally, it will be determined what correlations exist between a 
successful project and the selected factors. 
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2. WHAT DEFINES A PROJECT 
A brief discussion of what defines a project and the dimensions of project management are in 
order. According to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) Guide, a project is a 
temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique product, service, or result. (Project 
Management Institute, 2004) The temporary aspect implies the project has a definite beginning 
and definite end. In other words, projects are not ongoing efforts, but have a finite duration. This 
duration may be months or many years. As the project has a finite duration, likewise the project 
team generally will disband after the project is complete or terminated. A project’s unique 
characteristics result from the different end user, different requirements, different project team or 
contractor, and different design or product. The PMBOK definition of a project includes product, 
service, or result. A product is produced, is quantifiable, and either is an end item or a 
component item. A service is defined as a capability to perform a service such as a business 
function. Examples include production, distribution, or storage. Finally, a result may be an 
outcome or report that documents based on a research project providing new knowledge and 
insights. For the purposed of this paper, the focus will be on projects classified primarily as 
products.  
Another aspect of projects is what PMBOK refers to as progressive elaboration. Projects are 
completed in steps or increments. The project’s scope is initially defined and as requirements and 
customer desires become better understood, more detailed planning occurs. When a project is 
developed and completed under contract, the specific work to be done must be documented and 
understood by both parties to the contract. This process of progressive elaboration applies to 
projects and supports their uniqueness.  
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A natural extension of projects is project management. Project management is the execution of 
all activities to meet the project requirements. Although, not an exhaustive list, these activities 
include:  
• Identifying requirements 
• Establishing clear and achievable objectives 
• Managing the constraints of cost, schedule, and quality  
• Managing the expectations of all stakeholders including changes to specifications and 
plans 
Although these activities are critical, perhaps the most challenging one is to manage the cost, 
schedule, and quality. A major challenge of project management is achieving all three. An 
anonymous quote sums up the challenge quite succinctly, “Cost, Schedule, or performance … 
you can have any two, but not all three.” Here performance is synonymous with quality. Known 
as the “iron triangle” implying if there is a change in one of three components, a corresponding 
change will occur to one or both of the others.  
2.1. Cost  
Although cost appears to be straightforward, it is a complicated subject. Cost and price are often 
used interchangeably when discussing this topic. In addition, for a large project, costs can be 
broken down into contract costs, cost of the agency or organization managing the project (e.g., a 
government agency such as the Department of Defense), and the life cycle costs of a project 
incurred over its life. Does the contract cost include profit or fee? For this research, the cost 
elements for each project are identified to allow for analysis. The goal is to define the costs of 
the projects in a way to achieve a fair and unbiased comparison.  
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If the data is available, the cost or budget for the project will be evaluated by comparing the 
initial cost projection or budget to the cost at completion. The percentage over or under budget 
will determine the cost performance in turn used to measure overall project.  
2.2. Schedule  
Like cost, schedule is also not straightforward to define sufficiently for use in comparison. For 
many projects, the schedule may refer to an integrated master schedule or IMS. The IMS 
includes all activities necessary to complete the project. Usually associated with an IMS is the 
term ‘critical path” or the sequence of events or activities that determines when the project will 
be completed. Any delay or extension of an activity within the critical path will cause a 
corresponding delay in the overall project schedule. For the purposes of this research, the 
schedule will be defined as the agreed upon date for project completion between the customer 
and vendor/contractor. As with the aforementioned IMS, the schedule includes all activities 
necessary to complete the project. Similar to the use of Cost for evaluation, the original 
scheduled completion date will be compared to the actual delivery date of the project. 
 
Figure 1. Schedule (Planned vs Actual) 
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2.3. Customer’s Requirements or Performance 
Perhaps the most challenging of the three components of the “iron triangle” to define is the 
customer’s requirements. Also called “performance” in some areas of industry such as defense 
acquisition, this element is more than a project achieving a contractual set of specifications or 
performance parameters. Ultimately, the question is, “did the project deliver customer 
satisfaction?” In other words, did the project provide the needed capability, function, or system 
to meet the customer’s needs?  
The point to be made is in some cases the project delivered to the customer “meets the spec” or 
more accurately all the specifications contractually agreed to, however the customer is not 
satisfied. This may be the result of the adage, “We built the project right, but we did not build the 
right thing.” Again, there are many reasons why this may occur, such as poor or unclear 
specifications, uncertainty by the customer in knowing the true requirements, or limited 
communication and interaction between customer and vendor during the project design and 
construction. For this research, the customer’s requirements will be presented based on historical 
review of the available documentation. 
2.4. Definition of Project Success 
What is project success? Based on the previous discussion of Cost, Schedule, and Customer 
Requirements, a successful project is one completed within a reasonable schedule window, 
stayed within the budget, and delivered customer satisfaction. However, being able to declare 
project success based on these criteria is not that simple. If a project was 15 percent over budget, 
yet was on time and delivered customer satisfaction, it too has achieved a measure of success so 
a method to discriminate levels of success is desirable. This research defines success criterion in 
the following manner (The Standish Group, 1995): 
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Project Success: The project is completed on-time and on-budget, with all 
capabilities, features, and functions as initially specified. 
Project Challenged: The project is completed and operational, but over-budget, 
over the time estimate, and offers fewer capabilities, features, and functions as 
originally specified. 




3. PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND TYPE (COST, SIZE, PUBLIC VS.  PRIVATE) 
3.1. Type of Project 
The projects selected are classified by categories. At a high level, these are labeled defense 
projects, construction projects, and aviation/space projects. The projects are further broken down 
by type within the categories: military weapon system, transportation related, industry, 
dam/water control, or space system. 
3.2. Private or Public  
 A private project is defined as one funded by a publicly held or privately owned company or 
entity. Private projects are projects of every type that are owned, controlled, or commissioned by 
a private party. Private parties include individuals, homeowners, corporations, other business 
entities, non-profit associations, privately funded schools, hospitals, publicly traded companies, 
etc. Anything, in other words, that is not the government. (Scott Wolfe, 2013) 
Public projects are funded by government or municipalities. 
The term “state” can refer to projects commissioned by a county, city, municipality, government 
board, public school board or any other state-funded entity. The term “state construction” means, 
therefore, any government-funded construction that is not “federal” – which is discussed in the 
next section. 
The difference between state and federal projects simply depends on who owns or controls the 
underlying project site. The difference is not which entity funds the project, because federal 
funds are all over state (and even private) projects. The difference is in who owns and controls 
the project. 
3.3. Project Cost 
Three descriptors with associated ranges are used to categorize Project Cost as indicated below.  
Mega:  Greater than $10 Billion 
 10 
Large:  $1 – $10 Billion 
Medium:  Less than $1 Billion 
All dollar amounts adjusted for inflation to 2020 (Flyvbjerg, 2014). 
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4. PROJECT KEY FACTORS 
The present work considers fours key project factors. 
4.1. Leadership  
The term leadership covers an enormous range of concepts and characteristics. For the purposes 
of this research, leadership refers to the leadership associated with guiding or directing a project 
to a successful completion.  
Leadership can be described as one of the “intangible” characteristics critical to a project’s 
success. The term itself is nebulous and conjures up a very large number of synonyms and 
closely related ideas. Among these are charisma, influence, vision, decision making, self-
confidence, and personal energy, to name a few. Despite its fuzziness, leadership can make or 
break a project. There are numerous examples of project managers leaving and being replaced by 
a new manager with very similar qualifications. The new project manager turns the project 
around and makes it successful. Another aspect of leadership is the ability to manage and build 
relationships of trust with the project stakeholders. Perhaps difficult to describe objectively, 
building relationships is essential to project success. 
Leadership style. Additionally, the type of project requires the leader to alter his or her 
leadership style. Projects pushing new technology and innovation may lend themselves to a more 
hands off leadership approach, one that encourages collaborative and creative thinking within the 
project team. On the other hand, those projects that are well defined, but have other challenges 
such as being of large scale or facing a high-risk schedule, may dictate a different leadership 
style entirely, one that relies on communication and processes. Thus, the ability of the leader to 
recognize the optimum leadership style for the project and implement it successfully may be the 
leader’s “secret sauce” of project success. As mentioned previously, this may help explain how a 
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new project manager assuming the leadership role from a leader with similar qualifications and 
takes an under-performing project to a successful end.  
Intellect, skill, and dedication. In some situations, the sheer intellect, skill, and dedication of 
the leader is the primary reason for project success. While not chosen as a project for this study, 
an example of a project where much of its success can be attributed to the leader is the 
development and construction of the U.S.S. Monitor. The Monitor was the radically new 
ironclad vessel built by the United States Navy during the U.S. Civil War. The Monitor dueled 
with the C.S.S Virginia (formerly the Merrimac), a Confederate ironclad ship on March 8, 1862 
at the battle of Hampton Roads. After several hours of battle, neither ship could decisively 
declare victory and both withdrew from the fight. Despite the less than decisive outcome, the 
Union realized the Confederates did not have the ability to threaten the Union blockade of the 
Confederate states’ seaports and harbors. The Union blockade continued, cutting off vital 
supplies for the war effort. This slow strangulation of incoming goods was a major factor 
contributing to the eventual defeat of the Confederate States.  
John Ericsson, the Swedish shipbuilder who led the Monitor project, was one of the leading 
minds in maritime technology of his day, responsible for multiple innovations such as the screw 
propeller and steam engines with horizontal pistons for shipboard application. In fact, the 
Monitor had over 40 patentable inventions incorporated in its construction, many of them 
Ericsson’s. (Nelson, 2004, pp. 156-157) He was literally involved in every aspect of the design, 
acquisition, construction, and testing of the Monitor. He personally managed the acquisition of 
the materials and construction of the ship, visiting the different construction sites to monitor 
progress and lend his expertise to overcome technical issues. He developed relationships with the 
key stakeholders such as the U.S. Navy, and subsequently updated or revised requirements based 
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on their feedback. Some of these changes were made only after Ericsson had to be swayed 
through operational testing (and sometimes at high risk), but ultimately improved the 
performance. He knew every subcontractor and vendor supplying materials for the ship, visiting 
and communicating with each frequently. Under his leadership, the U.S.S. Monitor was built and 
delivered to the U.S. Navy in less than 100 days, as required by the contract. John Ericsson was 
the lynchpin for the Monitor’s noteworthy success.  
 
Figure 2. John Ericsson National Memorial, The Mall, Washington, D.C. 
(courtesy, Wikipedia, Creative Commons). 
The Leadership project factor will be evaluated using a rating scale considering the capability 
and effectiveness of leadership for as defined in Table 1.  
Rating Factor Rating Description 
Exemplary Role Model/Best in Class 
Superior Very Capable and Effective 
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Adequate Capable and Effective 
Marginal Somewhat Effective 
Unsatisfactory Needs Development 
Figure 3. Leadership Factor Rating Scale 
4.2. Requirements Definition 
There is urban legend about customers with the attitude of “Bring me another rock” when it 
comes to meeting their expectations for a product or solution. In other words, the customer 
cannot clearly express their requirements, hoping the contractor will provide the solution based 
on minimal information. This scenario is not favorable for a successful project. The 
customer/client and the project team must be in lockstep throughout the requirements definition 
process for the project.  
Requirements definition is a process essential to project success. If the customer’s requirements 
are not well defined, stable, and traceable, the probability of completing the project on time and 
within budget is unlikely. To that end, an active relationship between the project team and 
customer with frequent communication and interaction allows for the necessary discussion on 
cost, schedule, and performance tradeoffs that will invariably occur during a project. This 
relationship facilitates the dialogue on priorities of customer requirements, where the customer is 
flexible, and where not. Determining the customer’s requirements from the start is critical. 
Defining requirements is hard work, demanding thoughtful discussion among the stakeholders.  
The ideal requirements have the following characteristics: specific, unambiguous, performance-
based, achievable, verifiable, complete, and traceable back to the original need. Other more 
overarching desirable attributes of requirements are stability, singular goal, and balanced with 
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requirements flexibility from the stakeholders. A definition of derived requirements is 
appropriate in this discussion. Derived requirements are those are not explicitly stated in the set 
of stakeholder requirements yet is required to satisfy one or more of them. They also arise from 
constraints, consideration of issues implied but not explicitly stated in the requirements baseline, 
factors introduced by the selected architecture. (Requirements Development, 2018) Derived 
requirements drive the complexity and breadth of the overall requirements associated with a 
project. In addition to the basic set of customer or stakeholder requirements, there are derived 
and those resulting from statutes, regulations, and design considerations. 
Related to the concept of requirements definition is Project Scope. According to the PMBOK, 
defining and managing the project scope influence the project’s overall success. Project scope is 
defined as the work to be accomplished in order to deliver a product, service, or result with the 
specified features and functions. (Project Management Institute, 2004) 
The project scope statement is critical to success and builds upon the major deliverables, 
assumptions, and constraints documented during project initiation. As the project evolves, other 
tools such as the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) will be generated and used to document and 
manage the project scope.  
An example of how poor requirements definition can doom a project is the fate of the U.S. Air 
Force’s Expeditionary Combat Supply System (ECSS). Envisioned to transform the management 
of Air Force global logistics and supply chain network in support of worldwide operations, the 
ECSS was an integrated software platform developed to replace hundreds of legacy disparate 
computer systems. Launched in 2004, the Air Force was initially enthusiastic about the new 
integrated logistics concept that would make operations more efficient and effective, but the 
program was fraught with problems. Indeed, eight years into the program, the Secretary of 
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Defense cancelled the ECSS program after $1 billion spent. To make matters worse, the 
investment did not provide any useable capability. After the cancellation, the Air Force reverted 
to using the legacy systems that the ECSS program was supposed to replace and continues to use 
them today. What led to such a colossal failure of the program? Prior to the program’s inception, 
the Air Force did not adequately plan for its acquisition. Most notably, the Air Force had only a 
top-level idea of what capability the ECSS would deliver; a new, fully integrated logistics system 
that would replace an unspecified number of older, unconnected logistics systems.  (United 
States Senate Permanent Committee on Investigations Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs , 2014) 
The Air Force failed to define specific, achievable, and traceable requirements for the ECSS. As 
a result, the original solicitation for bids to contractors was vague and incomplete in many areas.  
The poor requirements definition up front and the lack of direction from the key stakeholders in 
the Air Force were major contributors to the program’s failure. Answering the question “What 
capabilities do I really need?” is key to success for any project.  
The Requirements Definition for each project will be evaluated primarily based on how well 
defined and stable the requirements remained through the project lifecycle.  It is unrealistic to 
consider all requirements, and the top level or “system” level requirements will be evaluated 
qualitatively.   
4.3. Technology Usage and Maturity  
Projects using or depending on new technologies with questionable maturity pose serious 
challenges to program success and often lead to delays, cost overruns and failure or cancellation. 
The uncertainty of technology maturity has played a role in many projects, driving cost and 
schedule issues, particularly in the Department of Defense and other government agencies. The 
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old adage “If you want it bad, you will get it bad” is usually born out in these situations. More to 
the point, poor performance or cancellation of projects results from rushing technology usage on 
systems or products before adequately matured and tested in realistic environments and 
representative levels of usage.  
Technology Readiness Levels. Determining technological maturity or readiness is challenging 
with many variables and factors for consideration in order to provide the necessary insight to 
project leaders. One methodology to assess technology readiness within governmental 
organization such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the 
Department of Defense is the use of the Technology Readiness Levels or TRLs. Technology 
Readiness Levels, originally developed by NASA, help assess the maturity of specific 
technologies using a numerical scale ranging from “1” to “9.”  For technology ranked at TRL 1, 
scientific research is beginning and the results translated into future research and development 
efforts. On the other hand, technology assessed to be TRL 9 has been proven through operational 
use in the intended environment. (Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, 
2009). Although not a foolproof method of assessing technology maturity, it is a tool for 
applying objective measurements to new technologies under consideration. However, it does not 
provide insight on the difficulty involved with maturing the technology to the appropriate level 
for use in the associated project. However, it does provide a departure point for project managers 
to discuss the risks of the use of the new technology. 
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Figure 4. DoD Technology Readiness Levels from U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO-20-48G, January 2020) 
Gartner hype cycle. A second methodology for assess technology uses the Gartner hype cycle 
to characterize the cycle of application of new technologies. The hype cycle has five steps: 
Technology Trigger: event such as the announcement of a breakthrough or product 
launch that generates interest with the public, businesses, and organizations 
Peak of Inflated Expectations: Publicity may result in unrealistic expectations and over 
enthusiastic promotion 
Trough of Disillusionment: Because the technologies fail to meet expectations, they may 
be abandoned  
Slope of Enlightenment: Despite being abandoned by some, other users continue to 
experiment and learn to understand the benefits and practical uses of the technology 
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Plateau of Productivity: More widespread adoption is occurring. The broad market 
relevance and application are being evident.  
 (The Mitre Corporation) 
 
 Figure 5. Example of the Gartner Hype Cycle™ 
(https://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/5-trends-drive-the-gartner-hype-
cycle-for-emerging-technologies-2020/) 
The Gartner hype cycle approach may be viewed as less rigorous than the use of TRLs; however, 
it may prevent organizations investing in technologies that may not be suitable for the customer. 
For example, when project stakeholders other than the customer promote the technology before 
its appropriate assessment of maturity and relevance putting project funding at risk.  
An example of a project where the underestimation of the technology challenge was a major 
factor in its eventual cancellation was the U.S. Navy’s A-12 aircraft. In the mid 1980’s the Navy 
embarked on an ambitious project to develop and build a new carrier based medium range attack 
aircraft. Importantly, the aircraft was to have “stealth” or low observable characteristics, making 
it difficult to detect by enemy radars. Although the U.S. Air Force was already operating stealth 
aircraft, the technology was still new in the industry, resulting in many challenges for the design, 
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integration, and manufacture of air vehicles. The requirement for the aircraft to take off and land 
from an aircraft carrier further complicated the project with additional structural design 
considerations.  
 
Figure 6. Artist's impression of the A-12 Avenger II in flight 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_A-12_Avenger_II) 
Designated the A-12 Avenger, the project was in trouble within two years of contract award with 
costs soaring $500 million over budget and estimated to be two years behind the original 
schedule. The two contractors building the A-12 claimed they did not have access to the 
technology information to complete the project and could not meet the requirements of the 
contract. Subsequently, the Secretary of Defense cancelled the A-12 project in 1991, four years 
after contract award. The Department of Defense and the two contractors ended up in litigation 
for nearly 23 years over who was to blame for the failure. As with many large project failures, 
many factors contributed to the cancellation of the A-12, but the immaturity of stealth 
technology for this application proved to be a principal cause. (Report on the Review of the A-12 
Aircraft Program ( Report #91-059), 1991) The Technology Usage and Maturity for each project 
will be discussed qualitatively considering the number of technical challenges involved, what 
new technologies were required, and level of maturity.  
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4.4. Vision and Clear Objectives  
The vision for a project (and team) must be understandable and concise. A well-known quote 
from the former CEO of Kodak Imaging, Bruce Swinsky, states “But good leaders simplify.” 
Arguably, this an important part of the project leader’s role. Usually the leadership of 
corporations, government agencies, or the military services will define the specific terms of the 
project. Ultimately, the project manager should have the latitude and discretion to define a vision 
to meet those terms and requirements. Although technically not the project manager, President 
John F. Kennedy set a clear vision for the nation’s space program when he spoke to a Joint 
Session of Congress on May 25, 1961. His extraordinary goal of sending a man safely to the 
moon and back within the decade serves as a superb example of setting a clear objective; 
concise, simple, and easy to understand. In his address, he said, “I believe that this nation should 
commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and 
returning him safely to the earth.” (Kennedy, 1961).  Although this example of a vision statement 
may be significantly beyond that of most projects in impact, cost, and effort, it illustrates the 
point of how critical a clear vision is to a project’s success. How does one measure “Vision and 
Clear Objectives?” For this research, each project’s vision and objectives will be evaluated 
through the consideration of clarity, ambitiousness, and realism.  
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5. THE LOCKHEED SR-71 BLACKBIRD 
Three case studies from large federal projects are used to analysis: The Lockheed SR-71 
Blackbird, Hoover Dam, and Project Apollo. 
In the 1950’s the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union was escalating. In an 
effort to monitor the Soviet Union’s progress in developing nuclear weapons and military 
facilities, the U.S employed satellites and manned aircraft for surveillance. The Lockheed U-2 
aircraft was developed as a high-flying reconnaissance platform to gather intelligence for the 
United States and first flew in 1955. These aircraft, operated by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), flew at altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet, above the ceiling of the Soviet’s air defense 
system of radars and surface to air missiles (SAM). However, U.S intelligence were concerned 
of the advances in Soviet technology and recognized the U-2 was increasingly vulnerable.  
On 1 May 1960, this fear was realized when Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 was shot down by a SA-2 
Guideline missile. Although uninjured, Powers was captured, tried for espionage, and sentenced 
to 10 years of prison and hard labor. He did not serve the full term as he was released in return 
for captured Soviet spy Rudolf Abel and returned to the United States. (U-2 Overflights and the 
Capture of Francis Gary Powers, 1960, 2020). The embarrassing event confirmed what U.S. 
intelligence agencies suspected; the consistent and potent advances in the Soviet air defenses. 
Fortunately, the U.S Air Force (USAF) and the CIA were engaged in a project to develop an 
aircraft that could both out run and out fly the Soviet Union air defense missiles and interceptors.  
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Figure 7. Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird (https://airandspace.si.edu/collection-
objects/lockheed-sr-71-blackbird/nasm_A19920072000 
At Lockheed, studies had been underway to improve the survivability of the U-2 aircraft by 
improving its maximum ceiling, use of enhanced electronic counter measures, and reducing its 
radar and infrared signatures. (Johnson, 1981). However, none of the measures were considered 
sufficient to provide the necessary improvement to the survivability of the U-2 against the 
increasingly capable Soviet threats. In response, a new manned aircraft design was underway 
that would travel at speeds in excess of Mach 3 (3 times the speed of sound) and fly at altitudes 
above 80,000 feet to avoid the Soviet air defenses. It would have a minimal radar cross section to 
help avoid detection and sophisticated electronic countermeasures for employment when 
detected. An air vehicle with such capabilities had never been built and faced numerous technical 
challenges.  
5.1. Leadership 
Clarence “Kelly” Johnson, the manager of the Lockheed Advanced Development Projects 
Division or more commonly known as the “Skunk Works” was the man tasked to lead the effort. 
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Kelly Johnson was a veteran manager of similar projects at Lockheed including the P-38 fighter, 
F-80 jet fighter, and the previously mentioned U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. In fact, Johnson had a 
role in the design of more than 40 aircraft while at Lockheed. Kelly Johnson, known for his near 
charismatic leadership style, started and managed the Skunk Works using “a concentration of a 
few good people … applying the simplest, most straightforward methods possible to develop and 
produce new products with minimum overhead and outside oversight.” He further said, “Our aim 
is to get results cheaper, sooner, and better through application of common sense to tough 
problems. If it works, don’t fix it” (Rich, 1995). His leadership was legendary and many of 
Johnson’s employees turned down promotions within Lockheed to stay on his team at the Skunk 
Works. With a proven track record, a high performing team, and strong stakeholder backing 
from the United States Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency, Kelly Johnson was a 
natural to lead the SR-71 development effort. Kelly Johnson is given much credit for his 
leadership of the Lockheed team and deservedly so.  
However, the team included more than Lockheed. Pratt and Whitney designed and built the  
J-58 engine that powered the SR-71 aircraft. Although Lockheed was the prime contractor, Pratt 
and Whitney’s engine design was key to the success of the aircraft and overall project. William 
Brown, the Engineering Manager at Pratt and Whitney, recognized the unique teaming between 
Lockheed his company. During a presentation at an American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics in 1981, he said, “As you have probably noticed, I have had difficulty in 
differentiating between “we” Pratt and Whitney Aircraft and "we” Lockheed. But that is the kind 
of program it was.” so great was the sense of collaboration and teamwork between the two 
companies. (Brown, 1981) Additionally, the government team’s approach to management was an 
enabler to the success of the project. A statement also attributed to Mr. Brown illustrates that 
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sentiment. He made the following statement, “That this complex, difficult program was 
successful is attributable in large part, to the management philosophy adopted by the 
Government people in charge. Their approach was that both the engine and airframe contractors 
must be free to take the actions, which in their judgment were required to solve problems. The 
Government management of the program was handled by no more than a dozen highly qualified 
and capable individuals who were oriented toward understanding the problems and approaches to 
solutions, rather than toward substituting their judgment for that of the contractors. Requirements 
for Government approval as a prerequisite to action were minimal and were limited to those 
changes involving significant cost or operational impact. As a result, reactions to problems were 
exceptionally quick. In this manner, the time from formal release of engineering paperwork to 
the conversion to hardware was drastically shortened. This not only accelerated the progress of 
the program, but saved many dollars by incorporating the changes while the number of units 
were still relatively small.” The leadership of Kelly Johnson at Lockheed and William Brown at 
Pratt and Whitney were key success factors to the program’s success. However, as Brown stated, 
the close working relationship demonstrated by the contractor and government team must be 
recognized. In total, over 300 subcontractors and vendors supported the program. 
Rating: Exemplary – proven track record, high performing team, high trust relationship between 
government and contractors. 
5.2. Requirements Definition 
The requirements for the Blackbird were challenging to achieve at the time, but were 
straightforward: go fast and fly high and not fall to enemy defenses. More specifically, the 
aircraft needed to provide a stable and reliable platform to gather photographic and other 
intelligence information for the United States and be invulnerable to enemy air defenses. As 
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stated previously, the aircraft would have to fly at Mach 3+ speeds at altitudes above 80,000 feet 
for extended mission times. The aircraft’s radar cross section would need to be as small as 
possible to avoid detection by air defense radars and employ electronic counter measures as 
needed. The derived requirements and technological challenge to achieve these goals were 
enormous, but overall the requirements set was stable and well defined.  
Rating: Well-defined, very specific mission, traceable to the customer 
5.3. Technology Usage and Maturity 
Because of the projected airspeeds in excess of Mach 3, the aircraft had to withstand temperature 
extremes beyond any aircraft yet built. Aircraft structures, wing skins, canopies, crew escape 
systems, radomes, and even fuel, lubricants, and hydraulic fluids would all require specialized 
designs or formulations to withstand the high operating temperatures during flight.   Engine 
technology to date had enabled speeds up to 2,000 miles per hour, but only in short bursts. This 
aircraft would require this speed and beyond for sustained periods, often hours at a time. To 
produce the power required, the J-58 Pratt and Whitney engines developed for the aircraft 
functioned as ordinary turbojets at lower speeds, but transitioned to ramjets at speeds above 
2,000 mph. (Bennie J. Davis, 2017)  
“Everything had to be invented. Everything.” is a quote attributed to Kelly Johnson when 
recalling the development of the SR-71 aircraft. Although the TRL methodology described 
earlier was not applied to the SR-71 technical challenges (TRLs did not exist then), it is possible 
to make some general observations about what the project faced.  
New tooling for the complex materials used had to be developed as titanium proved challenging 
for machining and handling. Lockheed launched a complete research program to determine the 
best tool cutter designs, cutting fluids, and speeds and feeds for the best metal removal rates. 
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(Johnson, 1981) A new quality control program was developed and implemented because of the 
more complex and demanding materials and manufacturing processes.  
New test fixtures and test methods were designed to test the components, subsystems and 
systems for the aircraft in the environments it would operate. A large oven had to be constructed 
to test the forward fuselage and cockpit (made up of over 6,000 parts) for thermal effects at the 
expected operating temperatures. Instrumentation did not exist to gather real time measurements, 
thus had to be developed to survive the hostile test conditions.  
Rating: the technology challenges were daunting for the aircraft. It would be in a new category 
for speed, altitude, and endurance. Aside from the Apollo space program, the technology hurdles 
were some of the most difficult facing the aerospace industry. Coupled with the aggressive 
delivery schedule, the success of the SR-71 program was a remarkable achievement. 
5.4. Vision and Clear Objectives 
The Soviet threat posed a real and unquestioned threat to the US and its allies. As early as 1955, 
officials in both Moscow and Washington had grown concerned about the relative nuclear 
capabilities of the Soviet Union and the United States. Given the threat that the nuclear arms race 
posed to national security, leadership in both countries placed a priority on information about the 
other side’s progress through monitoring. The surveillance provided by aircraft such as the U-2 
and satellite assets provided United States intelligence agencies essential information to keep tab 
on Soviet nuclear capabilities. Once the vulnerabilities of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft were 
identified, the need for a more capable manned platform became paramount. This translated into 
the need for an aircraft similar to the SR-71: a surveillance platform that could be rapidly 
deployed to the point of need to gather intelligence for the United States. William H. Brown, a 
Pratt and Whitney Engineering Manager in the program, summarized the issue this way; “The 
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Government stated that the need for the Blackbird was so great that the program had to be 
conducted despite the risks and the technological challenge. “ (Brown, 1981) 
Rating: The key components for a vision were there. That is the Who, What, How, When, and 
Goal. The United States (USAF, CIA, aerospace industry) stakeholders were tasked to build a 
high performing aircraft to conduct reconnaissance of the Soviet Union nuclear capabilities as 
soon as possible as a follow on to the high flying, but vulnerable U-2. 
5.5. Cost, Schedule & Performance: 
SR-71 Cost/Schedule/Performance:  
Cost: $34 Million per aircraft ($250 Million in current dollars) 32 aircraft were built 
Schedule:  30 months from approval to design, produce, and test to first flight of the A-12 (early 
version of SR-71). (32 months later, the first flight of the SR-71 took place, approximately five 
years from the project start.  




Figure 8. A-12/SR-71 Design, Production, Test, and Delivery 
The SR-71 flew non-stop from New York City to London in 1 hour and 55 minutes, then back to 
northern California for a round trip time of 3 hours and 48 minutes. It was, and still is the fastest 
and highest-flying aircraft in the world. More importantly, no SR-71 was ever lost due to enemy 
action. Of the numerous missions flown during the programs’ operational lifetimes, no nation 
ever shot down—or came close to intercepting—an A-12 or SR-71. (Santucci, 2013) Finally, it 
provided surveillance information on our adversaries to the nation’s intelligence agencies and 




6. THE HOOVER DAM  
The Hoover Dam was the largest dam, public project, and government contract in United States 
history when awarded in March 1931. (Smith, 2008) The Hoover Dam and Lake Mead behind it 
are located in the Black Canyon of the Colorado River about 35 miles southeast of Las Vegas, 
Nevada. The dam is a concrete thick-arch structure, 726 feet high and 1,244 feet long. The 
Hoover Dam is indeed a massive structure. It was the first man-made structure to exceed the 
masonry mass of the Great Pyramid of Giza. The dam contains enough concrete to pave a strip 
16 feet wide and 8 inches thick from San Francisco to New York City, or 3.25 million cubic 
yards of concrete. (Simonds, 2009) The dam was to serve four functions: produce hydroelectric 
power, flood control, silt control, and water storage. It can be argued that it served a fifth 
purpose; a source of jobs for many unemployed workers due to the Great Depression. Both 
Presidents Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt heralded the many jobs generated by the 
project.  
 
Figure 9. The Hoover Dam (https://www.usbr.gov/lc/hooverdam/ 
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The Colorado River had long caused flood devastation as snowmelt from the Rocky Mountains 
flowed through the Boulder Canyon. In 1905, flooding was so great the river flowed into the 
Imperial Valley of California for over a year and created a new body of water named the Salton 
Sea. The formation of the Salton Sea actually took place over several months as portions of the 
irrigation system that fed the agricultural area were compromised. In late November of that year, 
heavy flooding from the Gila River flowed into the Colorado River threatening the entire 
Imperial Valley. Despite efforts to reroute the Colorado onto its previous course, the summer 
floods in 1906 overwhelmed the works and inundated thousands of acres of crops, covered or 
damaged towns, and submerged miles of the Southern Pacific railroad. The Salton Sea grew to 
over 400 square miles. (Kennan, 1917)  
President Herbert Hoover had visited the lower Colorado River on numerous occasions during 
the early 1900’s. He was well aware of the challenges due to the flooding as previously 
mentioned, but also the opportunities it presented. He became the Secretary of Commerce in 
1921 and soon after presented the idea of a dam in the Boulder Canyon. The dam would provide 
hydroelectric power to the region, provide a water source to southern California, allow for 
expansion of irrigation for agriculture, and importantly help with flood control. Despite the many 
benefits of Hoover’s proposal (including the potential of the dam paying for itself by selling 
electrical power), several major obstacles existed. Perhaps the most problematic was that of 
water rights of the many states in the Colorado River basin affected by the dam project. The 
Colorado River Commission was formed in January 1922 at Hoover’s urging to solve the water 
rights issue. He proposed the Colorado River water resources to be divided into two groups, the 
Upper and Lower Basin States, with the division of water within each Basin to be negotiated 
later. The Upper Basin consisted of Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, New Mexico and a portion of 
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Arizona (portions of Arizona are in both Upper and Lower Basins). The Lower Basin consisted 
of California, Nevada, and part of Arizona. Hoover helped broker a compromise and finally on 
November 24, 1922 the commission agreed upon the Colorado River Compact. Six of the Basin 
states signed the compact along with the Federal government; Arizona did not sign until 1944. 
Despite the lack of Arizona’s support, the Colorado River Compact did pave the way for a dam 
in Boulder Canyon. However, it would take several years of introduction and reintroduction of 
bills in Congress to gain approval to start construction. Finally, in 1928, both the House and 
Senate approved a bill and President Calvin Coolidge signed it in December of that year.  
However, Herbert Hoover defeated Coolidge in the presidential election, replacing him in 1929. 
As the new president, he oversaw the formalization of the Colorado River Compact and the start 
of construction of the dam in 1931. Unfortunately, President Hoover was not able to see the 
project to fruition as Franklin D. Roosevelt defeated him in the 1932 presidential election. 
President Hoover did make a final visit to the construction site in November 1932 to pay tribute 
to the builders and highlighted the far-reaching impacts the dam would have on the region. His 
words proved to be accurate. 
6.1. Leadership 
The Hoover Dam was designed and built by the consortium called Six Companies, made up of 
construction giants Bechtel and Henry J. Kaiser, Morris-Knudsen, J.F. Shea Company, Pacific 
Bridge Company, MacDonald & Kahn, Limited, and Utah Construction. Six Companies banded 
together because no single company was could raise the $5 million required to secure the 
performance bond. (Hoover Dam: A Project for the Ages, 2020) The major tasks required of Six 
Companies were construction of the following: four tunnels to redirect the Colorado River, two 
spillways, four intake towers, the dam, two power stations, and two waterworks buildings. The 
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tunnels had to be completed within 2 ½ years of contract award to allow for construction of the 
dam. The dam was to be finished within seven years. (Smith, 2008) Beyond pooling resources to 
secure the performance bond, each company making up the Six Companies consortium brought a 
unique skill set to the table. J.F. Shea, a plumbing company, had extensive experience in 
constructing tunnels and other underground work. Utah Construction had built railroads in the 
western United States and Mexico. McDonald and Kahn had built many large buildings in San 
Francisco and Betchtel was known for road building. In addition to the contract awarded to Six 
Companies, several other ancillary contracts were issued. The Allis-Chalmers Company held the 
contract to build the power turbines for the electrical generators. Both General Electric and 
Westinghouse Electric were would provide the 82,500-Kilowatt generators. Babcock and Wilcox 
would provide the 14,000 feet of plate steel piping supplying water to the turbines and outlet 
works. The Union Pacific Railroad built and operated a 22.7-mile rail line from Boulder City to a 
point just south of Las Vegas. Power companies (Southern Sierras Power and the Nevada-
California Power Company) built a 222-mile power transmission line to provide power to the 
construction site and then after completion of the dam, to carry power from the dam to areas of 
Southern California. To house and support the 5,000 workers and their families, Boulder City 
was constructed. The town was planned using the accepted standards for municipal development 
and was constructed with paved streets, a water and sewer system, electrical power, a city hall, 
administrative building, schools, a hospital, and houses for the workers and their families. 
(Simonds, 2009) 
One of the leading dam builders in the United States during the Hoover Dam era was Frank T. 
Crowe. He had spent twenty years working for the Department of Reclamation and for private 
construction companies. His projects included the Arrowrock Dam in Idaho, the Jackson Lake 
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Dam in Wyoming, and the Tieton Dam in the state of Washington. Well known for his ingenuity, 
he developed a system of transporting concrete and equipment using a cableway system. Later, 
his mechanical prowess would be of great benefit on the Hoover Dam project. Prior to 1925, the 
Bureau of Reclamation (previously known as the Reclamation Service) was heavily involved in 
dam building projects. However, in 1925 it began contracting such projects out to private 
companies. Mr. Crowe had been involved in early planning on a dam for the lower Colorado 
River, assisting the Reclamation Commissioner, Arthur Powell Davis with cost estimating for the 
project and later with preliminary design work. He was deeply invested in the project and 
anxious to see it through to completion. He faced a dilemma when the Department began 
contracting out this type of project. In order to be a part of the Hoover Dam project, he elected to 
leave the Department of Reclamation and hire on with a private construction company. In 1924 
(need to confirm) he joined the Morrison-Knudsen Company and immediately became an 
influential player. His vast experience with the government in dam building and the cost 
estimation process proved valuable and he helped Six Companies develop the winning bid for 
the Hoover Dam project. Six Companies made a bid of $48.9 million for the project, just $24,000 
higher than the Department of the Interior had budgeted and $10 million below the next lowest 
bid. (Hoover Dam: A Project for the Ages, 2020) Six Companies won the contract on March 4, 
1931 and named Frank Crowe the construction superintendent.  
Frank Crowe’s nickname was “Hurry Up” Crowe, earned by his drive and determination to get 
the job done. This characteristic may have influenced decisions to place the project success and 
schedule ahead of the welfare of the workers. For instance, during the construction of the four 
diversion tunnels, Six Companies allowed the operation of gasoline powered trucks during 
excavation of the tunnels in direct violation of Nevada state law. In the poorly ventilated tunnels, 
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this practice made carbon monoxide poisoning a constant concern, endangering the workers. The 
state of Nevada sued Six Companies to stop the practice, but were unsuccessful. Crowe and Six 
Companies obtained a restraining order allowing the practice to continue until the case could be 
heard in federal court. In April 1932, a panel of federal judges ruled on the case and found in 
favor of the company. By this time, most of the tunnel construction was completed anyway and 
was essentially a moot point, but nonetheless a victory for Frank Crowe and Six Companies. 
(McBride, 1999) In another instance, a labor strike took place during August of 1931 due to poor 
working conditions. Among their grievances were excessive heat in the tunnels (at times above 
130 degrees Fahrenheit), poor drinking water, and a lack of proper safety precautions. Instead of 
attempting to improve conditions, Crowe and Six Companies blamed agitators for the unrest and 
turned to unemployed workers clamoring to take the place of the strikers. In reality, conditions 
were dangerous for the workers constructing the dam. During July 1931, fifteen men are 
documented to have died, some attributed to heat prostration. However, Crowe denied any deaths 
occurred as a direct result of working on the construction site. Due to his actions, he was deemed 
a “company man.” Nonetheless, his vision, mechanical ingenuity, and dedication to the project 
were key factors for success. Under Frank Crowe’s leadership, construction of the Hoover Dam 
completed two years ahead of schedule. On Feb. 29, 1936, Crowe handed the finished project 
over to the Bureau of Reclamation. 
Rating:   Superior – highly experienced, innovative and knowledgeable leaders, competent 
execution of the contract requirements while employing some noted questionable practices    
6.2. Requirements Definition 
The requirements for the Hoover Dam were stable and well defined. The specific tasks are 
mentioned in the Leadership section, but are repeated here for consistency. The major tasks 
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required of Six Companies were to construct the following: four tunnels to redirect the Colorado 
River, two spillways, four intake towers, the dam, two power stations, and two waterworks 
buildings. The diversion tunnels had to be completed within 2 ½ years of contract award and the 
dam within seven years. (Smith, 2008) Due to the remote location and lack of nearby towns, 
many derived requirements evolved. Also previously mentioned, the project required housing 
and facilities to support the 5,000 workers and families. Transportation systems (roads and 
railroads) and electrical power distribution was needed to support the construction.  
Rating:  Well-defined, stable requirements delineated in the contract awarded to Six Companies.   
6.3. Technology Usage and Maturity 
One of the major challenges of design and construction of the Hoover Dam was the sheer size 
and scale of the project. Prior to the proposed dam in Black Canyon, the highest dam in the 
world was the Arrowrock Dam in Idaho. At just over 348 feet high, Arrowrock Dam was less 
than half the height of the proposed dam, which would be the Hoover Dam. Before the dam 
could be built, solutions to several construction complications would have to be found and 
implemented. (Simonds, 2009) The construction site itself was located in a remote location 
requiring extensive work to provide transportation of equipment and materials, communication, 
sources of electrical power, and housing for the 5,000 workers and their families. Although none 
of these construction support efforts were considered novel, the scale and austere conditions at 
the construction site made them major and difficult tasks. The distances from major towns and 
the magnitude of the construction materials to be used required railroads, roads, power 
transmission lines, and other support facilities built in harsh environments. The terrain was 
rugged, rocky, with steep grades. The climate was equally severe, with temperatures exceeding 
100 degrees Fahrenheit 24 hours continuously in the valley where the dam was to be located. To 
 37 
help transport the enormous amount of construction materials and equipment to the dam site, a 
150-ton capacity cableway was built, spanning the canyon just below where the powerhouses 
that would be eventually located. As mentioned in the Leadership section, Frank Crowe 
pioneered the same technology to improve the efficiency and speed of construction for large 
dams. In 1911, while working on construction of the Arrowrock Dam in Idaho, he developed two 
practices that proved pivotal in the building of superdams. The first was a pipe grid used to 
transport cement pneumatically, the second was an overhead cableway system employed to 
deliver workers, equipment, and concrete rapidly to any point on a construction site. (Chief 
Engineer: Frank Crowe, 1999) Both these techniques paid great dividends during the Hoover 
Dam project due to the extensive amounts of concrete required and the sheer size of the 
construction site.  
Another challenge with using the massive amounts of concrete required for the dam, was 
removing the heat generated by the concrete curing or hardening process. Concrete pouring 
generates heat as it creates an exothermic reaction. The heat produced by concrete during curing, 
called” heat of hydration” occurs when water and cement react. If the temperature of the concrete 
is too hot during hydration, it will have high early strength, but less later in development 
resulting in lower durability of the concrete. Additionally in large mass concrete pours such as 
those in the Hoover Dam, the internal temperatures may be much higher than that of the surface. 
The large temperature gradient may result in thermal cracking. (The Importance of Concrete 
Temperature Gradients, 2020) Due to the sheer magnitude of concrete required for the dam and 
its associated structures, the levels of generated heat were a major concern. To reduce the 
cooling and contraction time, an artificial cooling system was employed. A system of embedded 
pipe loops with refrigerated water flowing through them was successfully tested by the Bureau of 
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Reclamation at the Owyhee Dam in Idaho in 1931, two years before concrete placement started 
on the Boulder Dam project. (Simonds, 2009) For the Boulder Dam, a dedicated cooling tower 
and refrigeration plant were constructed on site and began operation in August 1933. Carried out 
in two stages, air- cooled water was circulated through the tubes followed by refrigerated water 
through the same tubes. In May 1935, when most of the concrete pours were completed and the 
cooling operations terminated, more than 590 miles of pipe was embedded in the dam with over 
159 billion BTUs of heat removed. (Simonds, 2009) 
A final aspect of Technology Usage and Maturity discussed is the formation of the Six 
Companies. Although not specifically a technical advance, the companies forming together and 
pooling their resources and expertise was innovative. The companies joined forces because no 
one company could afford the cost of the performance bond, but this allowed them all to share 
the risk and their talents. This proved to be a successful model for large construction projects and 
has been widely used to this day. Indeed, the Bechtel Engineering Company (then known as 
Henry J. Kaiser & W. A. Bechtel Company) deems it the world’s first “megaproject.” 
Rating: The technology challenges in constructing the Hoover Dam were very different to those 
the SR-71 program faced. Large construction projects using massive amounts of concrete were 
not unheard of this era. Nevertheless, the challenges posed by the Hoover Dam were the harsh 
environment, the distance of the site from a city or town to offer support, and the enormous 
quantity of concrete required for the dam, tunnel complex, and powerhouses. At 726 feet high 
and 1,244 feet long, the Hoover Dam was the largest dam built in the United States when 
completed. During construction, no extraordinary technology was employed, but the builders did 
use innovative approaches to improve efficiency and speed of the construction such as the 
cooling system and the concrete and material delivery system. At the dedication of the dam on 
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September 30, 1935, President Franklin Roosevelt referred to the dam as "an engineering victory 
of the first order - another great achievement of American resourcefulness, skill and 
determination." It was and still is an engineering marvel. 
6.4. Vision and Clear Objectives  
Many recognized the Colorado River as a potential water source for irrigation of land in 
California’s Imperial Valley for many years. During the 1850’s ideas for that purpose were 
discussed, but no real development started until the turn of the century. In 1896, the California 
Development Company began constructing canals in the Imperial Valley and the first water from 
the Colorado River was delivered in 1901. (Simonds, 2009) As discussed in the Hoover Dam 
opening section, the flooding of the Imperial Valley in the early 1900’s was so destructive that 
farmers, landowners, and area residents turned to the U.S. government for relief. Other areas 
affected by flooding of the Colorado River and its tributaries sought help as well, such as Yuma, 
Arizona. As a result, the Bureau of Reclamation began study of how to tame the river and take 
advantage of its resources.  
Although not a new idea, Herbert Hoover championed the idea of a dam project to help control 
the unpredictable floodwaters from the river as well as produce electric power and provide 
irrigation to the region. He is often credited for bringing the project to fruition, particularly in his 
role as Secretary of Commerce when he helped craft the Colorado River Compact.  
Rating:  the Hoover Dam project was an audacious and courageous undertaking. (Hoover Dam: 
A Project for the Ages, 2020)  Long recognized as a way to restrain the flood prone Colorado 
River, the dam served multiple purposes as previously mentioned and provided thousands of jobs 
during the Great Depression.  Ultimately, the vision and objective was concise, simple, and easy 
to understand. 
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6.5. Cost, Schedule & Performance 
Cost: just under$49M, or $860M today the project was completed on budget 
Schedule: Contract was awarded in March 1931 and turned over to the Bureau of Reclamation in 
February 1936 after five years of construction (2 years ahead of schedule) 
 
Figure 10. Hoover Dam Schedule (Contract Award and Construction Phases) 
Performance: the dam has been successful in all purposes: water storage, flood control, silt 
control and hydroelectric power, and during construction provided as many as 5,200 jobs during 
a time when the nation was in financial crisis.  In 1955, the American Society of Civil Engineers 
selected the Hoover Dam as one of the seven modern civil engineering wonders of the United 
States. (Simonds, 2009, p. 52) 
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7. PROJECT APOLLO 
On July 20, 1969, the Lunar Module Eagle touched down on the surface of the Earth’s moon. 
Astronauts Neil Armstrong and Edwin “Buzz” Aldrin became the first men to touch foot on the 
moon. The culmination of eight years of near Herculean effort, many recognize this feat as the 
most remarkable of mankind’s achievements. Responding to President John F. Kennedy’s 
challenge to send a man to moon within the decade, the nation reacted swiftly, awarding 
contracts to major aerospace contractors Boeing’s Aerospace Division, Grumman Aircraft 
Engineering Corporation, and North American Rockwell Corporation Space Division to develop, 
build, and test the space vehicle. At its height, the Apollo program involved more than 400,000 
engineers, scientists, and technicians from more than 20,000 private companies and universities 
to reach the achievement of man walking on the moon. The costs associated with the program 
were unprecedented; estimated at $25.4 billion in 1969 dollars or $178.5 billion today. More 
than the monetary cost, the program took the lives of three astronauts. On January 27 1967, 
during a “plugs-out” test of the Apollo 1 spacecraft (it was not designated “Apollo 1” until later), 
while on the launch pad, fire erupted in the Command Module. All three astronauts: Virgil “Gus” 
Grissom, Edward “Ed” White, and Roger Chaffee died while strapped in their seats. After a 
critical look at the program and an intensive redesign of the Apollo spacecraft, the program did 
recover. Initially viewed as the underdogs in the “space race,” the United States surpassed the 
Soviet Union’s early achievements with the successful Apollo 11 mission. The Apollo 11 
mission was really the culmination of three evolutionary projects (Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo) 
designed to bridge the technology gaps of space flight and provide NASA confidence.  
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A program as audacious, expansive, and complex as the Apollo Project encompassed many 
leaders at multiple levels, with different skill sets, and specific emphases. The massive program 
covered nearly eight years in time and too many facets for a single individual to lead. This 
section will discuss three of the myriad leaders that brought Project Apollo to success.  
Dr. Werner Von Braun emigrated from Germany and was the core of technical leadership at 
Huntsville. At the end of WW II, he and 100 members of his rocket development team 
surrendered to the United States. In the U.S., they assembled and tested captured V-2 rockets for 
high altitude research. (The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Wernher von Braun", 2020). Von Braun 
quickly rose in the ranks and led the development of ballistic missiles for the U.S. Army. In 1957 
after the Soviet Union launched two Sputnik satellites in rapid succession, Von Braun led the 
U.S. effort to launch the nation’s first satellite, Explorer 1, on January 31, 1958. Soon afterwards, 
he transferred to the newly formed National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
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office in Huntsville, Alabama. There he led the development of the Saturn heavy space launch 
vehicles used in the Apollo program. The performance of these Saturn launch vehicles was 
unparalleled. Over the history of the Saturn program, there were 32 rocket launches. Each launch 
was successful and on time and met safe-performance requirements. (The Editors of 
Encyclopaedia. "Wernher von Braun", 2020) 
Beyond his technical accomplishments, Von Braun was also politically and media savvy. As 
stated by Dick Richardson, CEO of Experience to Lead, about Von Braun, “He could scan the 
environment beyond his technical expertise to understand the political, societal and economic 
trends. This ensured his success by anticipating alternative pathways when problems arose.” 
(Richardson, 2019) His leadership skills are evident throughout his career. As WW II 
progressed into 1944, Von Braun recognized the looming defeat of the Nazi regime. He 
decided to secure a path for his core engineering team to America. Because of his knowledge 
of liquid fueled rockets, he knew he would be highly sought after the war ended. Once 
working in the United States, he rapidly ascended in roles and responsibilities, culminating 
as the Deputy for Planning at NASA’s headquarters in Washington, D.C. 
George Low does not have the name recognition with the Apollo Project as Dr. Von Braun, Neil 
Armstrong, or even Gene Kranz of Apollo 13 fame. However, as time goes on, his reputation 
grows as one of the premier leaders on the program. As stated by fellow NASA engineer Bob 
Gilruth during an interview in 1987; “George was good at everything. He was worth about 10 
men.” (Arrighi, 2019) 
During Project Apollo Low oversaw the redesign of the command module spacecraft after the 
fire in 1967 and the following year he made the decision to accelerate the schedule by sending 
the first crewed spacecraft around the Moon in December 1968. (Arrighi, 2019) 
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Perhaps more significant than his leadership during these events was his vision for putting a man 
on the moon. He was one of the principal advocates for a lunar landing as a goal for NASA in 
the early days. Despite President Dwight Eisenhower’s lack of enthusiasm for a manned flight to 
the moon, Low persisted. (Jurek, 2018) In early 1961, he led a commission that built a detailed 
plan for getting to the moon within the decade. (Arrighi, 2019) Fortuitously President John F. 
Kennedy, just sworn into office, was anxious for a public relations victory on the heels of the 
Bay of Pigs fiasco. President Kennedy quickly endorsed George Low’s moon mission. It was, in 
fact, his plan that became the foundation for Kennedy’s “by the end of the decade” challenge. 
(Jurek, 2018)  
The loss of three astronauts on January 27, 1967 rocked the country and the Apollo program 
when a fire erupted in the Command Module during testing. George Low generally did not 
express much emotion even when he did not agree with decisions or facing tough situations. This 
was not true with the Apollo 1 fire. Low was angry and frustrated that such an event could take 
place at this point in the program. Fortunately, he was able to effect change as NASA’s 
leadership tapped him to be the program manager of Apollo in April. He was charged with 
determining what other problems plagued the spacecraft and fix them in time to keep the 
program on schedule. He recognized one of the causes of the fire was the inadequate 
coordination of engineering changes on the complex Apollo system. Without a disciplined 
change management process, the redesign effort would bring more of the same. In response, he 
established the Configuration Control Board or CCB, providing a formalized system to 
document and track the hundreds of technical changes generated by the redesign effort. He 
demanded participation from every branch of the Apollo management and supply chain, 
including contractors like North American and Grumman. (Jurek, 2018) His efforts paid off. 
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During the next two years, the CCB met 90 times, considered 1,697 changes and approved 1,341. 
(Jurek, 2018) The result was restored confidence for the astronauts and within NASA as a whole 
that Apollo’s leadership was doing all it could to build a safe spacecraft to do complete the 
mission.  
During the Apollo redesign effort, George Low recognized and opportunity to make up lost 
schedule on the program. Apollo 8, scheduled for December 1968, was planned to test the 
command module, the service module, and the lunar landing vehicle in Earth’s orbit. However, 
the lunar landing vehicle, built by Grumman, was not going to be ready for flight. When it 
became apparent the lunar landing vehicle would not fly in December, Low proposed a flight to 
orbit the moon ahead of the landing, with just the command and service modules. Despite 
opposition by NASA’s leadership, the mission was approved just six weeks before the launch of 
Apollo 8. “It was the boldest decision of the space program,” according to Chris Kraft, NASA’s 
head of flight operations. (Jurek, 2018) The move was one of sheer genius, allowing the program 
to proceed with the systems available. As Low stated, “Navigation to the moon, getting into 
lunar orbit, the burning of the big engine, the computer programs that were needed for that—we 
could get all of that out of the way.” (Jurek, 2018) Low considered all the resources and 
capabilities available to contribute to the overarching objective, and then devised and 
communicated a plan to execute those resources. George Low’s adaptability and vision guided 
America to the moon first and helped ensure the success of Apollo 11’s lunar landing in July 
1969.  
Soon after President John F. Kennedy assumed office in 1961, he asked James E. Webb to 
consider taking the job of Administrator for NASA. Established in October 1958 the new 
organization was viewed by many as needing an administrator with a strong technical 
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background. Webb did not have any specific technical expertise, but was an experienced 
businessman and attorney. (Who is James Webb?, 2020) He had served in the Truman 
Administration in both budget and State Department positions as well as numerous managerial 
roles in private industry. He did not see himself possessing the ideal qualifications for the job. 
However, President Kennedy chose him because of his managerial skills, political acumen, and 
the ability to navigate the myriad national and international policy issues NASA would face. He 
was a master at bureaucratic politics, understanding that it was essentially a system of mutual 
give and take. (Project Apollo: A Retrospective Analysis, 2014)  
He led NASA during the height of the Apollo program, with over 35,000 employees in the 
organization and 400,000 contractors. (Project Apollo: A Retrospective Analysis, 2014). During 
his tenure, NASA faced some of its darkest days, such as the deadly fire of Apollo 1 and the 
ensuing effort to get the program back on track. He took much of the blame himself and shield 
NASA in order to preserve the mission to the moon.  
James Webb resigned from NASA in October 1968 before President Lyndon Johnson’s term in 
office ended. (Project Apollo: A Retrospective Analysis, 2014) He wanted the new president to 
have a clean slate to select a new administrator. A short nine months later, the Apollo 11 mission 
successfully landed Neil Armstrong and Edwin “Buzz” Aldrin to the moon’s surface. Webb’s 
leadership and contribution to the success of Project Apollo was not diminished. John Pike, the 
Director of the Space Policy Project at the Federation of American Scientists, explained why the 
American effort was successful stating, "The reason we got to the moon before the Russians was 
they didn't have anybody to pull it together. The critical difference was we out-managed them." 
(Redd, 2017) Webb kept NASA on task after the Apollo 1 tragedy, secured funding for the 
Apollo project, and dealt with the political pressure of Congress throughout his time at NASA. 
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Although he did not possess the technical genius of Werner Von Braun or George Low, James 
Webb played an essential role in the extraordinary success of Project Apollo.  
Despite the success of Apollo, James Webb was determined to maintain a balance at NASA 
between science missions and manned space flight. NASA launched over 75 missions into space 
to study much more than to prepare for the lunar landing. These science missions investigated 
the stars, the sun, and the Earth, increasing the competence and knowledge of the U.S. scientific 
community.  
The enormously complex program to put a man on the moon required leadership in multiple 
dimensions, levels, and functional areas. Dr. Von Braun knew rocketry and led the Saturn V 
development. He also had the uncanny ability to read the political winds and alter course as 
needed. George Low was “get your hands dirty” engineer who could take on any technical task 
that arose. Yet, he also was able to conceptualize a mission to the moon and developed a realistic 
plan to achieve it. James Webb provided the top cover for NASA, delivering Project Apollo with 
resources, defending the program, and clearing obstacles as needed. All three men were integral 
to the success of the program through very different roles and contributions.  
The leaders discussed in this section are representative of the dozens of leaders that brought 
Project Apollo to fruition. Unfortunately, it is not possible to recognize the efforts of the leaders 
associated with literally hundreds of organizations in the U.S. government, industry, universities, 
and the military supporting the program. As in any large scale or megaproject like Apollo, there 
are many untold stories of superb leadership that took place.  
Rating: Exemplary – It is difficult to recognize the role leadership played in the 
accomplishments of Project Apollo.  The technology challenges notwithstanding, the number of 
prime contractors, sub-contractors, and overall employees supporting the project was 
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unprecedented in a peace time undertaking.  It was a model of collaboration between public and 
private sectors; multiple government agencies, the U.S. military, universities and thousands of 
contractors and vendors resulting in a great technological achievement.  
7.2. Requirements Definition 
The overall mission to fly to the moon, deliver a man safely to its surface, and then return to 
earth within the decade on its surface appears straightforward. However, the number of derived 
requirements, those not explicitly stated, needed to achieve this goal was unfathomable. The 
subsequent section on Technology Usage and Maturity describes some of the technical 
challenges facing the program driven by the requirements for the moon mission. Breaking the 
mission into segments is instructive for comprehending the breadth of Apollo’s requirements. On 
July 16, 1969, the Saturn V launch vehicle carried the Apollo spacecraft with three astronauts 
onboard into space beyond the earth’s gravitational pull. During the next phase of the mission, 
the three major elements of the Apollo spacecraft (Command Module, Service Module, and 
Lunar Module) were reconfigured and powered by the Saturn IVB burn, started the journey to 
the moon. Once reaching the moon and entering into lunar orbit, the Lunar Module, with 
astronauts Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin onboard, separated from the Command Module and 
descended to the moon’s surface. After spending 21.5 hours on the moon’s surface, Armstrong 
and Aldrin departed the moon’s surface and rendezvoused with the Command Module. The 
Command and Service Modules then made the flight back to earth. Once re-established in earth’s 
orbit, the astronauts prepared for re-entry into the atmosphere by jettisoning the Service Module. 
The Command Module with three astronauts onboard splashed safely into the Pacific after just 
over eight days of flight. (Apollo 11 Mission Overview, 2019) Each mission segment discussed 
had unique requirements in multiple arenas such as propulsion, stability and control, 
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communications, navigation, thermal management, and life support. Realistically this list only 
scratches the surface of the myriad requirements generated by Project Apollo.  
Rating:  The overall requirement for Project Apollo’s mission is well-defined.  What is not so 
evident are the myriad derived and associated requirements needed to achieve the “man to the 
moon” mission.  At the early stages of Project Apollo, NASA was not sure how to reach the 
moon, thus many requirements were not even in existence.  Thus, many requirements were yet to 
be defined and would be evolving as the project proceeded.   
7.3. Technology Usage and Maturity  
Project Apollo actually was an evolutionary effort starting with Project Mercury, progressing to 
Project Gemini, and culminating with the Apollo spacecraft, launched by the Saturn V rocket. 
Each successive phase proved out technology, gathered scientific data, and gave NASA 
confidence to forge ahead for the lunar landing mission. Project Mercury focused on placing a 
man in orbit and provided valuable information on biomedical aspect of space and control and 
tracking space vehicles. (Project Apollo: A Retrospective Analysis, 2014) Project Gemini was 
intended to bridge the gap between Mercury and Apollo. The ten manned Gemini missions gave 
NASA insight on extended operations in space, experience with navigating and docking 
spacecraft in space, and astronauts operating outside of spacecraft (extra-vehicular activity). 
Finally, Apollo would provide the vehicle and equipment to reach the moon and support a lunar 
landing. In conjunction with the manned flight efforts, NASA launched many scientific missions 
to learn about the moon’s environment and surface in preparation for a lunar landing. 
What new technologies were developed during this quest for putting a man on the moon? Similar 
to the discussion of the SR-71 challenges, almost everything about space flight (and specifically 
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manned space flight) would require innovation. Although powered flight had been advancing 
steadily for nearly sixty years by this time, space flight was a truly new domain.  
A comprehensive discussion of the myriad technologies developed for Project Apollo is not 
realistic for this work. As an alternative, a short discussion of three key representative examples 
will be briefly described.  
The Saturn V rocket that propelled the Apollo spacecraft and astronauts into orbit was an entire 
technical challenge itself. The rocket stood 363 feet tall and fully fueled weighed 6.2 million 
pounds. (Rocket Park, 2011).  
The rocket’s first stage generated 7.5 million pounds of thrust from five massive engines 
developed for the system. (Project Apollo: A Retrospective Analysis, 2014)  
The F-1 engines developed by the Rocketdyne Division (part of North American Aviation) were 
unprecedented in size and performance. Engineers had to develop new alloys and construction 
techniques for their successful realization. Even so, one engineer even characterized rocket 
engine technology as a "black art" without rational principles. (Project Apollo: A Retrospective 
Analysis, 2014). The massive engine suffered from combustion instability resulting in chaotic 
forces that would destroy the engine if allowed to go unchecked. Looking back to smaller scale 
engines including the V-2 rocket of Dr Von Braun’s previous work, it was determined the fuel in 
the F-1 needed to be more evenly distributed prior to combustion. A series of baffles were added 
to balance the distribution, stabilizing the burn and thus solving the problem.  
During the time of Project Apollo, computers were large and could fill a room. Additionally, the 
normal interface was a card reader that accepted a stack of cards with commands punched on 
each one. This would not work on Apollo where space and weight were at a premium. 
Importantly, the astronauts needed direct access to the flight computers carried onboard Apollo. 
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The onboard computers that flew the command module to the moon and back to earth, and 
another that flew the lunar module from orbit around the moon to a safe landing, then back up 
into orbit—were the smallest, fastest, most nimble computers ever created for their era. 
(Fishman, 2019) 
In order to achieve the size required for spaceflight, the Apollo computers used “core rope 
memory” and was the most efficient available. But, the cost and time required to build each 
memory unit was high; each unit took eight weeks to build. Factory workers, usually women, 
painstakingly encoded each bit of information by hand. (Brock, 2017) 
The unprecedented size of the Saturn V rockets that would carry the Apollo spacecraft to the 
moon required new and extraordinary support equipment for maintenance, launch operations, 
and transport. One such machine was the Crawler-Transporter, designed to move the fully 
assembled Saturn V and spacecraft “stack” from the vehicle assembly building to the launch pad 
at Kennedy Space Center.  
This is but one of the uniquely designed system in support of Project Apollo and certainly one of 
the largest. Built by Marion Power Shovel of Ohio, the massive tracked vehicles can carry a 
payload of 18 million pounds on a platform the size of a baseball diamond with a hydraulic 
leveling system. The Crawler-Transporter itself weighs 6.6 million pounds and when moving 
large loads such as the Saturn V rockets, traveled at a speed of 1 mile per hour. (The Crawlers, 
2021)  
 The Crawler-Transporter continued to support subsequent space programs such as the Space 




Figure 12. Crawler-Transporter (https://www.nasa.gov/content/the-crawlers 
As previously mentioned, the selected technology challenges described only scratch the surface 
of the multiple faced in Project Apollo. It was the largest technological non-military endeavor 
ever undertaken in the history of the United States, and one might argue in modern history. 
(Project Apollo: A Retrospective Analysis, 2014)  
As a final note, the concerted development efforts supporting Project Apollo resulted in dozens 
of new technology advancements benefiting all of civilization. New fabrics, coatings, medical 
devices, battery and solar power are but a few of the products that we enjoy today spawned from 
the Apollo program. It is not unusual for spin-offs to occur because of technical innovative 
projects, but the sheer number of those from Project Apollo are extraordinary. (Benefits from 
Apollo: Giant Leaps in Technology, 2004) 
Rating:  the technology challenges facing Project Apollo were similar to those designing and 
building the SR-71; many hurdles had to be overcome. There many were “firsts” and “things 
never been done before” necessary to achieve the goal of safely delivering the astronauts to the 
moon and back within the decade.  Few argue that is still one of the most remarkable and 
impactful technical human endeavors.  As in the words of Neil Armstrong when he stepped onto 
 53 
the surface of the moon on July 20, 1969, “That’s one small step for man, one giant leap for 
mankind.”   
7.4. Vision and Clear Objectives  
In the discussion of Vision and Clear Objectives in Section 4.4, President John F. Kennedy’s 
charge to the nation to put “a man on the moon within the decade” was referenced as the 
benchmark. His vision for what became Project Apollo is often quoted as the model of brevity, 
simplicity, ethos and power for a vision statement. (Richardson, 2019) To be clear, although 
brief and simple, his vision demanded tremendous effort and expenditure of resources to make it 
a reality. President Kennedy was anxious for the United States to overtake the Soviet Union in 
the “space race.” The Soviets had been first to launch a satellite into orbit in 1957 and first to put 
a human in space and orbit the earth. With the Cold War raging, President Kennedy was 
compelled to demonstrate the nation’s technical prowess and resolve; that it was every bit as 
capable in space as the Soviet Union. After consultation with NASA’s leadership, he decided a 
manned flight to the moon would accomplish this goal.  
Rating:  As mentioned in Section 4.4, President John F. Kennedy’s vision is often used as the 
model when describing the desirable attributes of a vision statement.  The success of Project 
Apollo bears that out.    
7.5. Cost, Schedule & Performance 
Cost of Apollo: $25.4 Billion  




Figure 13. Project Apollo Schedule (JFK challenge to Apollo 11) 
Performance: Apollo 11 successfully traveled to the moon and landed two astronauts on the lunar 
surface. The crew of three returned to earth safely after an eight-day mission. Five subsequent 
Apollo missions took place successfully landing astronauts on the moon. Apollo 13 did not 
successfully complete its mission due to an explosion onboard the Service Module. Fortunately, 




The three projects analyzed in this work were clearly successful in terms of achieving the 
requirements and meeting the prescribed schedule. As defined in Section 1.4, the project is 
successful if completed on time and on budget, with all capabilities, features, and functions as 
initially specified. The question of whether the budget was realized is difficult to ascertain for the 
SR-71 Blackbird project and Project Apollo due to lack of readily available cost data. The 
Hoover Dam project was completed at the contractor’s original bid. Notwithstanding the lack of 
budget information on the two aforementioned projects, what are similar aspects that may 
correlate to their success?  
Four key factors were analyzed for each: Leadership, Requirements Definition, Technology 
Usage and Maturity, and Vision and Clear Objectives. Each project had positive ratings for the 
factors. Each factor is briefly discussed in context of the three projects analyzed.  
8.1. Leadership  
Leadership was a key component for all three projects. This is not surprising as success for any 
endeavor is highly dependent on capable leadership. However, the leaders of the projects 
provided a blend of skillsets or strengths that made the difference. Clarence “Kelly” Johnson’s 
vast experience in leading innovative aviation projects, his knowledge and expertise of aircraft 
performance, and his ability to build and motivate high performing teams made him the ideal 
candidate for the SR-71 Blackbird program. His unique management style encouraged creativity, 
trust, and accountability persuading many of his employees to turn down promotions within 
Lockheed to stay on his team. (Rich, 1995) The SR-71 program was perhaps his crown jewel 
based on the longstanding and number of speed and altitude records it achieved.  
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Frank “Hurry Up” Crowe also had unique qualifications for his role in managing the construction 
of the Hoover Dam. Similar to Clarence Kelly Johnson, his career with the Department of 
Reclamation managing multiple dam construction projects in the western United States prepared 
him well to lead the Hoover Dam project. As previously described in the leadership section on 
the Hoover Dam, Crowe was also adept at developing and using technology to achieve project 
success. He leveraged these construction techniques and tools during the Hoover Dam project. 
Finally, he was dedicated to the success of the project. As mentioned, he resigned from the 
Department of Reclamation and hired on with the Morrison-Knudsen Company to play an 
influential role in the construction. He frequently visited locations around the project at all hours 
of the day and night, checking on the status of the construction phases.  (McBride, 1999)  
Due to the complexity, number of stakeholders, and enormity of Project Apollo, many key 
leaders were involved. This work highlighted three in particular: Dr. Werner Von Braun, George 
Low, and James Webb. As described in the leadership section of 5.3 Project Apollo, each leader 
played a specific role in the success of the program. Von Braun brought the corporate knowledge 
and experience of the V-2 program from Germany and further developed this knowledge 
working on ballistic missiles for the U.S. Army. This enabled him to lead the Saturn rocket 
development program, which was vital to the success of Project Apollo. Von Braun also 
surveilled the political landscape and used his skill to help NASA maintain its stature. George 
Low was the consummate engineer and problem solver and helped Project Apollo recover from 
the Apollo 1 tragedy and set back. In addition to his technical prowess, he was a respected leader 
who cared about the people working for him and particularly those affected by his decisions, in 
particular the astronauts. Highlighted previously, he was a visionary in laying out a realistic plan 
to reach the moon. Finally, James Webb served as the NASA Administrator during the time of 
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Project Apollo, enabling its success by defending the program and securing the necessary 
funding. As the top official of NASA, he also dealt with the aftermath of Apollo 1 and took 
much of the blame.  
8.2. Requirements Definition  
Regarding requirements definition, each of the projects benefited from stable, clear requirements. 
As previously discussed, this does imply the requirements were small in number or simplistic. 
For instance the derived requirements for each project was significant, particularly so for Project 
Apollo. Each major component of the Apollo mission (Saturn V rocket, Command Module, 
Service, Module, and Lunar Module) had thousands of requirements. However, the overarching 
requirement (e.g. build an aircraft to fly at speeds greater than Mach 3 and at altitudes in excess 
of 80,000 feet) for each project remained stable. When requirements frequently change or 
“creep” when the customer levies new requirements without a commensurate adjustment to 
budget or schedule, the project is generally at higher risk of not being successful. Overall, the 
management of the requirements for the SR-71 Blackbird, the Hoover Dam, and Project Apollo 
was effective and contributed to the overall success of the projects. 
8.3. Technology Usage and Maturity 
The use of technology in the three projects was significant, although in different aspects. As 
discussed in Section 4.1, new materials, propulsion, life support systems, and manufacturing 
methods all required development for the SR-71 Blackbird to be successful. The Lockheed 
Skunk Works team matured these technologies to enable extended operation of the aircraft at 
speeds and altitudes never achieved before. Although similar in some technical respects, Project 
Apollo was perhaps an order of magnitude greater in the technology challenge than the SR-71 
program faced. The mission to land on the moon and return the astronauts safely to earth 
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required significantly more resources in time and money to achieve success. From concept 
studies to first flight of the A-12 (predecessor to SR-71 aircraft) was four years. President 
Kennedy announced the goal of reaching the moon in May 1961 and the Apollo 11 mission took 
place just over eight years later in July 1969. Comparing the resources for the two projects is 
illustrative as well; approximately 300 vendors and subcontractors supported Lockheed in 
developing the SR-71 aircraft. At its peak, over 400,000 people and 20,000 vendors and 
subcontractors worked on Project Apollo. There were multiple new technologies used in Project 
Apollo, some were matured in evolutionary steps as part of the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo 
projects. Manned space flight had been just demonstrated when NASA embarked on the mission 
to land on the moon.  
The Hoover Dam project did not require new technologies to be successful. However, as 
discussed in Section 4.2, the challenge it presented was the scale of the project in terms of size, 
amount of concrete required, and the lack of infrastructure to support the effort. New 
technologies were used in the construction of the dam such as the cooling system to deal with the 
heat load from the concrete curing process as well as the overhead cable system to transport 
materials rapidly on the dam site. These advances in construction technology had been 
demonstrated in earlier dam construction projects so they were proven out. In terms of the NASA 
technology readiness levels, these technologies could be ranked as TRL 9, whereby the system 
has been completed and demonstrated in the actual environment.  
In summary, the technology usage and maturity for the SR-71 aircraft and Project Apollo were 
critical factors involved in their success. Any technology not at the appropriate maturity level 
would delay the schedule or jeopardize the overall success of the project. Despite the high risk 
technologies used on these two projects, the combination of the other factors (strong leadership, 
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well-managed, stable requirements, and clear objectives) drove their success. The Hoover Dam 
did not rely on technology usage for the dam itself, but did so in the construction methods 
utilized. 
8.4. Vision and Clear Objectives  
As stated in Section 3.4, the vision and objective of each project was to be evaluated through the 
consideration of clarity, ambitiousness, and realism. There is ample documentation on the vision 
for Project Apollo as laid out by President John F. Kennedy. Indeed, his vision is often the 
benchmark for assessing vision statements. It was clear, ambitious almost to the point of being 
audacious, and realistic. One could argue whether the requirement for a lunar landing within the 
decade was realistic, but in retrospect, it proved to be so. There is less evidence or at least 
publically available information on the actual vision and objectives related to the SR-71 project. 
Discussed in Section 4.1, the need for such an aircraft was compelling in light of the ongoing 
Cold War and the needs of the leadership of the United States in monitoring our adversaries. The 
vital and more challenging requirement for the ability to conduct reconnaissance with impunity 
was a major factor in the vision of the A-12 and SR-71 aircraft. The challenges of the 
technologies facing the developers made it an ambitious undertaking.  
The vision for a dam on Colorado River basin had been emerging for many years prior to the 
actual Hoover Dam project. First as a source of water for irrigation for southern California, then 
for flood control as the devastation of flooding in the early 20th century occurred, and finally as a 
source of hydroelectric power, the vision evolved. Because of the political nature the 
undertaking, the multiple states affected, and many commercial interests at stake, it was nearly 
80 years before the vision became a reality. The vision for what became the Hoover Dam was 
ambitious in that it was the largest dam ever built in the United States at the time and with no 
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nearby infrastructure to support the construction. Another aspect of the ambitious nature of the 
project is that multiple companies had to merge together to be able afford the performance bond, 
indicative of the large scale the endeavor.  
8.5. Unique Aspects of the Projects 
The SR-71 aircraft development, the construction of the Hoover Dam, and Project Apollo were 
successful. However, it is of interest to identify and discuss other considerations and 
circumstance that influenced each project. Although difficult to quantify or determine precisely, 
each project enjoyed or benefited from unique conditions and environments.  
Cold War Environment  
The existential threat of the Cold War helped garner support for both the SR-71 aircraft and 
Project Apollo. The SR-71 was in fact a product of the need (perceived or real) for rapid 
reconnaissance and related intelligence gathering of the Soviet Union and its allies. Project 
Apollo was also viewed as critical to demonstrate the United States’ leadership in the “space 
race” with the Soviet Union. As quoted from a NASA report, “The Cold War realities of the 
time, therefore, served as the primary vehicle for an expansion of NASA's activities and for the 
definition of Project Apollo as the premier civil space effort of the nation.” (Project Apollo: A 
Retrospective Analysis, 2014) This ensured support from a broad array of high-level 
stakeholders including the White House, Congress, and the Department of Defense. Specifically 
for the SR-71 (and its predecessor the A-12), the Central Intelligence Agency and the United 
States Air Force were also strong advocates. This high-level support translated into sufficient 
funding for the projects from Congress. Another potentially enabling factor for Project Apollo 
was the pride and patriotic fever for the United States to be first to the moon. President Kennedy 
recognized the seriousness of the Soviet Union’s challenge for dominance in space and his 
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subsequent vision for the United States lunar mission was a response to that challenge. NASA, 
the thousands of contractors supporting Apollo, and the general populace were onboard with the 
nation’s quest to be first to the moon as well. In fact, the Grumman Corporation assigned its best 
and brightest to the Lunar Module program, without long-term business expectations. It only 
produced 15 vehicles with a net profit of only 1.9% at the contract’s peak in 1969.  (Skurla, 
2004) 
Security classification  
Another aspect of the A-12/SR-71 program that may have been helpful to its success was the 
level of security classification applied to the program. Often labeled as a “Black” program, the 
secrecy surrounding may shield it from the scrutiny other programs would normally receive. 
Indeed, this may be true of any “Black” project; however, this may not always provide benefit. 
Again, it is difficult to determine how the secrecy of the SR-71 project contributed to its success. 
However, it may be fair to say that limited visibility and minimal reporting simplified the team’s 
processes, allowing it to focus on the development of the aircraft.  
Lax enforcement of state laws  
In the case of the Hoover Dam, the construction efforts benefited from lax enforcement of state 
laws. Mentioned briefly in Section 4.2, the Six Companies were responsible for digging four 
tunnels to divert the Colorado River in order for the dam construction to take place. The four 
tunnels, two in the Nevada canyon wall and two in the Arizona canyon wall, were approximately 
one mile in length and 50 feet in diameter. The tunnels had to be completed within 2 ½ years of 
contract award to allow time for the dam construction within the overall seven year contract 
period. In other words, the diversion tunnels were on the critical path. Six Companies used trucks 
powered by internal combustion engines to transport the rock debris and material excavated from 
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the tunnels. However, Nevada law prohibited the use of equipment powered by internal 
combustion engines in confined spaces, such as tunnels. Despite Nevada’s protest and lawsuit 
against Six Companies, the court ruled against Nevada. Six Companies exploited the lack of 
enforcement of the law and completed the tunnel projects one year ahead of schedule. Whether 
or not the overall dam project could have been completed within the seven-year period without 
the use of trucks for the tunnel excavation is unknown. Nevertheless, the fact that Nevada’s law 
was not enforced, allowed Six Companies to accelerate the excavation process perhaps at the 
expense of the workers in the tunnels.  
Innovative Management Techniques 
 One final aspect for discussion with respect to these three projects is the innovative management 
techniques or relationships employed. Each project adopted a new management framework, by 
design or necessity. The SR-71 project team led by Lockheed’s Clarence Kelly Johnson worked 
closely with Pratt and Whitney. This relationship was touched on briefly in Section 4.1 with a 
quote from William Brown regarding the collaboration and teamwork he saw while serving as 
the Engineering Manager at Pratt and Whitney. This collaborative environment was essential for 
the overall success of the program as the two contractors operated as one team, enhancing 
communication and sharing of information. The integration of the J-58 engine into the aircraft 
was an enormous challenge, thus the one team philosophy was fundamental to its success. Noted 
in Section 4.1 as well, the government’s “hand’s off” approach in providing oversight to the 
Lockheed and Pratt and Whitney team allowed freedom to make changes with minimal 
administrative burden, saving time and money.  
When construction started on the Hoover Dam, it would be the largest dam ever built in the 
United States. Discussed in Section 4.2, no single company had obtained the financial backing to 
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obtain the performance bond for the project. Thus, the Six Companies Consortium arose to join 
forces for the construction of the dam. Aside from the increased financial clout the merger 
offered, each company possessed different expertise, collective knowledge, and construction 
experience that contributed to the Hoover Dam. Although not unique today, the Six Companies 
working together on the Hoover Dam was a relatively new concept for construction projects. The 
construction of the dam required multiple construction projects (summarized in Section 4.2) and 
the companies making up the consortium leveraged their respective skillsets to build the myriad 
infrastructure projects in addition to the dam and the directly related facilities. The Six 
Companies did not take on any further joint ventures after the Hoover Dam, but went their 
separate ways. (Hoover Dam: A Project for the Ages, 2020) 
Project Apollo is most notable for the technical achievement of reaching the moon, landing two 
men on the moon surface, and returning to earth safely. Many technological and engineering 
achievements enabled Project Apollo to be successful. Section 4.3 mentioned just a few of the 
many technology spinoffs resulting from Project Apollo. However, achievement in the 
management field was also remarkable. As stated by Dale Wolfe in Science, “…It may turn out 
that [the space program's] most valuable spin-off of all will be human rather than technological: 
better knowledge of how to plan, coordinate, and monitor the multitudinous and varied activities 
of the organizations required to accomplish great social undertakings.” Indeed, orchestrating the 
efforts of the thousands of contractors and sub-contractors producing the components of the 
Apollo spacecraft was a triumph of the project. For example, the Saturn rocket development 
involved five major contractors with more than 250 subcontractors, provided millions of parts 
and components for use in the launch vehicle, all meeting exacting specifications for 
performance and reliability. (Project Apollo: A Retrospective Analysis, 2014) Noted previously 
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in Section 4.3, all 32 launches in the development and operation of Saturn V rockets were 
successful.  
Another management challenge for the program was overcoming the biases and cultural 
differences of the various communities involved. This included NASA civil servants, 
contractors, and university personnel, all who had different priorities and expectations. Yet, even 
stronger differences existed between the engineering community and the scientific community 
within Project Apollo. The engineers were tasked to build the hardware and software to 
accomplish the mission within budget and to meet schedule. Scientists on the other hand were 
concerned about designing experiments to continue research in space and bristled at the 
constraints imposed by the engineers. (Project Apollo: A Retrospective Analysis, 2014) 
Maintaining the balance to satisfy each side while accomplishing the overall objective laid out by 
President Kennedy was a constant struggle for NASA’s leadership. One final aspect of the 
management of Project Apollo was the paradigm shift that took place regarding the amount of 
in-house work conducted by NASA. Because of the enormity of the project, NASA did not have 
the personnel or resources to develop and build the spacecraft and supporting systems. The work 
was accomplished by contractors with NASA personnel providing oversight and technical 
direction. NASA’s engineers struggled with how best to accomplish this oversight and often 
sparred with leadership. During development of the Saturn rocket, the second stage was 
delivered to the Marshall Space Center in Huntsville, Alabama. After testing identified some 
anomalies, NASA personnel started a time-consuming engineering investigation jeopardizing the 
schedule. James Webb informed Werner von Braun to cease the practice and to trust the industry 
partners. (Project Apollo: A Retrospective Analysis, 2014) Eventually a compromise was 
negotiated; called the 10 percent rule, whereby 10 percent of NASA’s funding was spent to 
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ensure in-house expertise was available while also confirming the contractors met their 
performance specifications. (Project Apollo: A Retrospective Analysis, 2014)  
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9. WRAP UP THOUGHTS 
In summary, the SR-71 Blackbird project, the Hoover Dam, and Project Apollo all deemed 
successful projects. Superior leadership, well-defined requirements, and clear objectives were 
common to all three. The technologies used on the SR-71 and Project Apollo were successfully 
achieved for both, but required a concerted maturity effort by the developing teams. The Hoover 
Dam employed technology advances during construction ensuring the construction was 
completed within budget and on schedule. Other factors came into play that contributed to the 
success of the each project.  
Author and scholar Victor Davis Hansen observed, “Our ancestors were builders and pioneers 
and mostly fearless” in an article he penned about the accomplishments of past generations  
(Hansen, 2019).   The author feels similarly about the visionaries, leaders, and teams that led the 
three projects discussed and hopes they will be emulated in the future. 
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